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PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION
OF A CONDEMNATION APPEAL:
THE CONDEMNEE'S VIEWPOINT
PA1UCK J. RoHAN*
This article is devoted to the topic of appellate review of con-
demnation awards. In some jurisdictions, an affected property owner
may appeal a commissioners' award to the appropriate court and
thereby obtain a jury trial de novo. Thereafter, the jury, and not the
commissioners, is considered the trier of the facts. This article does
not cover jury trials, as such, but rather appeals in the traditional
sense, that is, appellate review of the determination of the trier of
the facts- whether that trier be a judge, jury, or board of commis-
sioners. Since the appellate procedures vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, this article proceeds by way of an analysis of an appeal
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The practical aspects
and problem areas touched upon should, however, be similar to
those arising in condemnation appeals in the state courts. In any
event, where an appeal is contemplated, counsel should immediately
consult local governing statutes and court rules in order to preserve
his rights on appeal 2
As in most other controversies, the ultimate burden of deter-
mining whether to appeal a determination below rests with counsel.
This is especially true in the condemnation field because of the prop-
*Professor of Law, St. John's University; B.A., LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M.,
Harvard University; J.S.D., Columbia University.
I See generally Nicuors, ON EMiNENT DoMAIN § 26.73 (3d ed. 1965); LAWRENCE, CON-
DENNAIoN 101 et seq. (1967). The 1951 Supplementary Report of the Advisory Committee
on Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure listed only five states as utilizing
commissioners, twenty-three utilizing commissioners coupled with a jury trial de novo, and
eighteen employing trial by jury exclusively. For a description of appeals from the com-
missioner's award under state practice, see Johndroe, Procedural Pitfalls in a Condem-
nation Case, 1959 S.W.L.F. INST. ON EMm-rr DOMAIN 101, 119-30.
2 See infra note 15.
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erty owner's lack of knowledge of the law involved and the intricacies
of judicial review. In deciding whether the case is worth appealing,
the condemnee's counsel must consider the customary considerations
relative to every appeal, such as whether the substantive law is
favorable, the equities presented by the facts, the number and seri-
ousness of the errors found in the record, and the pattern of the
appellate court in prior cases of a similar nature. He must next con-
sider the costs, in time and money, involved. Condemnation records
are usually lengthy and appellate printing costs may therefore be
excessive.3
The scope of review in condemnation cases is another critical
element to consider. Where the condemnee is appealing, he is faced
with the fact of life that appellate courts are more prone to accept
rather than reject the end product of the trier of the fact. This
tendency is accentuated in condemnation cases for several reasons.
First and foremost, the central issue, that of value, is usually a com-
plicated factual issue at root. Again, the appellate court is not dis-
posed to substituting its view for that of the trier of the fact, who
after all did see and hear the witnesses (and may have actually viewed
the property itself).4
Nevertheless, there are times when an appeal is unavoidable, as,
for example, where the award is grossly inadequate or where sub-
stantial errors have been committed below. At other times the claim-
ant will be drawn into an appeal as respondent when the condemnor
decides to take the case up for review. Where this is a distinct pos-
sibility, it may be well to bide one's time temporarily, to ascertain
whether the other side will carry the burden of being the appellant.
If the condemnor takes an appeal, the claimant can then either fill
the role of respondent or cross-appeal. 5
3 An attorney cites a condemnation record that ran to 14,000 pages and included over
500 exhibits. See S. Searles, Pre-Trial and Procedural Aspects of Condemnation, TnE
PRACTICrAL PROBLEMS OF CONDEMNATION 11, 16 (1965). Under modem practice rules, it may
be possible to cut these costs substantially by reproducing the record without a formal
printing, or by reproducing only pertinent passages of the transcript.
4 "Frequently and usually, the court below inspects and views the property before,
during or after the trial and is then able to somewhat check the expert's ideas and opinions
against the physical facts .... [Accordingly], the appellate courts are reluctant to reverse
or remand, even though it might have arrived at a different result, based upon the trial
record." H. DOLAN, Federal Condemnation Practice, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL PRACxcE
99, 117 (Am. Inst. Real Estate Appraisers 1961). See also United States v. Twin City Power
Co., 253 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958).
5 See Sackman, Condemnation Appeals, 8TH S.W.L.F. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 127,
150 (1968), wherein the author cites the use of this tactic by condemnor's counsel.
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MAKING AN ADEQUATE RECORD AND PRESERVING OBJECTIONS
Making an Adequate Record
This section concerns preparation of an adequate trial record,
against the possibility that an appeal may ultimately be necessary
to secure just compensation. In brief, every condemnation case should
be tried for both the benefit of the trier of the facts (judge, jury, or
commission) and for the appellate court. Quite frequently, the trier
of the facts will have expertise in the eminent domain field, or the
trial will last long enough for him to become familiar with the facts
and the issues. An appellate court, in marked contrast, hears innu-
merable appeals each month and cannot examine the case at its leisure.
Moreover, there are no expert or other witnesses about to clarify
ambiguities. Accordingly, it behooves trial counsel to provide a sound
and clear record for ultimate review.
By way of illustration, an appraisal expert's qualifications and
familiarity with the area should be brought out at the trial. The
witnesses' testimony should indicate not only their conclusions but
the formula or the chain of reasoning that produced the end result.6
If multiple approaches to value are used, it should be clear which one
was relied upon primarily, and which ones were only used for a
double check. The appraisal witness should be thoroughly conver-
sant with every facet of his comparable sales and with defects in the
comparables offered by the other side. Generous use should be made
of photographs, diagrams, and other forms of demonstrative evi-
dence.7 As part of the record, these items will provide a substitute
for a view by the appellate judges, and will help orient them with
respect to the property.8 When references are made to portions of
the property by the witness, the locations involved should be fixed
by means of an "X" or other notation on the exhibits, in order to
enable the appellate court to follow the testimony in the record.9 On
6 See generally Coon, The Appellate Lawyer Looks at Opinion Evidence in an Ap-
propriation Case, 39 N.YS.B.J. 505 (1967). See, e.g., United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192
(1964); Conklin v. New York, 22 App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1965);
Yennock v. New York, 23 App. Div. 2d 809, 258 N.Y.S.2d 490 (4th Dep't 1965).
7 See generally P. RoHA & M. PrSINs, CONDEINATION PROCEDURES &. TECHNIQUES, dc.
8 (1968).
8 One experienced practitioner suggests that helpful exhibits from the record be re-
printed in the brief and that the attorney consider drafting his own diagrams for inclusion
in the brief. In this manner, the judges on appeal can follow the diagrams during the
attorney's oral argument. See Sackman, Condemnation Appeals, 8rs S.W.L.F. INsr. ON
EMmmr DoiAwN 127, 157 (1968).
9 This is standard practice in the trial of negligence cases.
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the negative side, the appraisal expert's testimony should demonstrate
that he considered and subtracted benefits conferred on the property
by taking (if any), and also made allowances for items of loss which
are deemed noncompensable.
In some instances there may be no record, or a very inadequate
one, if the condemnee's counsel does not take the initiative in seeing
that one is made. Thus, for example, where a trial is had before
commissioners, a request should be made for a stenographic or other
form of record, perhaps with the cost thereof being shared by both
sides (if not absorbed by the tribunal itself). Again, where one or
more particular aspects of the case (such as whether a change of zone
is imminent or the extent of severance damages) are likely to be
crucial, it is sound practice to request that the judge, jury, or com-
missioners make specific findings on each of the points in question.10
In a similar vein, memoranda of law and requests to charge directed
to these issues should also be prepared."
The condemnee's appeal will be an empty gesture if his counsel
has failed to make and preserve timely objections. In some jurisdic-
tions it is necessary to proceed by way of a formal bill of exceptions.12
In most, however, timely objections to incorrect rulings will suffice.
Where testimony has been excluded, however, it may be advisable
to tender it or to have it taken down for the record so that it will be
available to the reviewing court. Even where a great deal of informal
proof is admitted, it may be well to note one's objection to hearsay,
just to call attention to the question of the weight of the evidence
being introduced.
As in the trial of any action, appellate courts require the com-
10 The request for specific findings on key elements or issues in the case would be
made in addition to, and not in lieu of, requests to charge. The importance of such
requests for specific findings cannot be overestimated. Although the trier of the facts
(judge, jury, or commissioners) must make an adequate record and findings to facilitate
appellate review, the trier of the fact need not answer every question raised on the trial.
Accordingly, in many cases the condemnee has been held to have waived his right to have
certain questions answered where he made no advance request for specific findings on those
items. See, e.g., United States v. 8,065.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, 187 F. Supp. 728
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
For the procedure followed in federal court in filing objections to the report of the
commissioners, see 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAGTICE & PROCEDURE § 1526 (rev.
ed. 1958).
11 Illustrative requests to charge are set forth in Appendix C-3 of P. ROHAN & M.
RESIN, supra note 7.
12 See Bell, Preserving Error for Appeal of the Eminent Domain Case, 1959 S.W.L.F.
INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 151, 154-55; Johndroe, Procedural Pitfalls in a Condemnation
Case, 1959 S.W.L.F. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 101, 119-30. Under the Federal Rules,
objections to the report of the commissioners must be served on all affected parties within
ten days of receipt of notice of the report. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
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plaining party to take other available steps to help avert a faulty
trial. Thus, both objections and cross-examination should be used to
point up an expert's lack of qualifications, any errors in comparable
sales, and like defects.' 3 Again, it is commonly held that objections
to the judge's charge to a jury or commissioners should be made in
advance and accompanied by the condemnee's own proper requests to
charge.' 4 Similarly, objections filed to the commissioners' findings
and award should point up specific objections, as opposed to general
complaints about the adequacy of the award. These objections should
also be exhaustive, since they are usually incapable of being enlarged
upon on appeal, on remand, or on any other subsequent phase of
the litigation.
Local Rules Relating to Condemnation Appeals
The prosecution of a condemnation appeal brings into play the
local procedural rules governing appeals, as, for example, whether
a motion for new trial must be made before an appeal can be taken.
A much more serious cause of concern, however, are local statutory
and court-made rules which may be peculiar to condemnation appeals
and not generally known to the bulk of practicing attorneys. Thus,
for example, some jurisdictions require condemnation appeals to be
processed within a brief, specified period of time, while others may
require the posting of a bond or other security as a concomitant of
the appeal. In other jurisdictions, the right to appeal may be lost if
the condemnee withdraws the amount the condemnor paid into court
after the commissioners' initial award. Accordingly, even the ex-
perienced appellate lawyer should make diligent inquiries as to the
local rules governing condemnation appeals as a class.15
APPEALABLE ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
Under both federal and state practice it is generally accepted
that an appeal can only be taken from a final order or judgment.
13 For judicial admonitions to this effect, see United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land,
More or Less, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963); District of Columbia v. Lot 813 in Square 568,
232 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 346 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964). For a parallel requirement in
state practice, see Bell, Preserving Error for Appeal of the Eminent Domain Case, 1959
S.W.L.F. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 151, 154-55.
15 See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ B 15-25 and B 15-26, requiring that con-
demnation appeals involving the city must be prosecuted within six months of the filing
of a notice of appeal and that this time limit may only be extended by leave of court.
It should also be noted that on the trial level, Section 71A of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure stipulates that local state rules as to trial of a condemnation case by a
jury, commission or both, will control in federal court, if the condemnation takes place
under a state's eminent domain power.
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This general principle is applicable to condemnation cases as well.'"
Accordingly, a party may not be able to appeal until the question of
value has been settled and all other aspects of the case finally deter-
mined. The delay may be of critical import to the condemnee, es-
pecially in cases in which the condemnee alleges that the taking is
unlawful, or in which other aspects of the case may delay the entry
of final judgment.' 7 In a few instances, lower federal courts have cer-
tified the urgency of the condemnee's needs in order to expedite
appellate review before a final order or judgment was entered.' 8 In
situations in which the condemnee alleges an illegal taking, rapid
review has sometimes been obtained through use of extraordinary
remedies, such as an action for mandamus or injunction proceed-
ings.' 9 In a few instances, federal courts have reviewed the propriety
of a district court's denial of a jury trial, without requiring the con-
demnee to wait until after his case had been tried by three commis-
sioners.20 However, most federal courts treat this as a nonfinal order.21
Another trap for the unwary is found in the condemnee's failure to
appeal on time. A careful check of local procedural rules should be
made to ascertain just when the case becomes ripe for an appeal. Thus,
for example, in a jurisdiction wherein all parcels in a proceeding
are tried together, must the first property owner wait until all parcels
have been assigned a value before he can appeal, or does the avail-
ability of partial decrees advance his time to appeal? Must additional
papers be filed or served to start the time to appeal running or does
16 See, e.g., Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. United States, 300 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1962);
United States v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, 334 F.2d 229 (4th Gir. 1946).
17 In large cities it is not uncommon to have a condemnation backlog which delays
trial of a proceeding for up to a year. Another six months or more may be consumed in
perfecting an appeal.
In United States v. Certain Lands in the Borough of Manhattan, 332 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.
1964), the court of appeals entertained an appeal from a denial of a tenant's motion to
restrain the government from taking possession.
18 See, e.g., United States v. 3,065.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, 187 F. Supp. 728
(S.D. Cal. 1960). Where partial final decrees are employed, it has been held that under
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules, an appeal must be taken from that decree and not from
the decree settling the last parcel in the proceeding. See Scholl v. District of Columbia,
331 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
19 See infra note 89 and accompanying text. For illustrative pleading in this type of
case, see Appendix C of P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 7.
20 See, eg., United States v. Hall, 274 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 US. 990
(1960).
21 See, e.g., United States v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, 334 F-2d 229 (4th Cir.
1964); Beneke v. Weick, 275 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1960). See also 3 BARRON & HOLTZOPF,
FEDERAL PRACrtICE S PROCEDURE § 1525 (rev. ed. 1958). Similar rulings have been made by
some state courts in interpreting state practice rules. See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Spetko,
15 App. Div. 2d 789, 224 N.Y.S.2d 776 (4th Dep't 1962).
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the period commence when the court publishes its finding and
awards?2
Absent a recognizable legal error, the scope of appellate review
in condemnation cases is extremely narrow, irrespective of whether
the case was tried to a judge, jury, or commission. Thus, for example,
a federal district court must accept the findings of commissioners
appointed by the court, unless the findings are "clearly erroneous."23
The United States court of appeals, in turn, will merely examine
the record to determine whether the district court erred in accepting
or rejecting the commission's findings, again applying the clearly
erroneous standard.2 4 Where the crux of the appeal relates to the
quantum of the award (as being excessive or inadequate), the ap-
pellate courts will not disturb the finding below unless the amount
awarded is so far out of line as to "shock the conscience of the
court."'2r Whatever their wording, most state appellate courts apply
similar yardsticks in passing upon condemnation appeals.26 Several
factors combine to limit the scope of appellate review in condemna-
tion cases. As previously noted, at root the question of value is a
highly complex factual issue. Again, the trier of the facts has the
benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses and possibly visiting the
site of the condemnation. Lastly, the award under review invariably
falls within the "range of testimony," that is, somewhere between
22It is not always easy to determine what is a "final order" or judgment, even in
federal practice. Thus, for example, a formal order which journalized action of the federal
district court as reflected by a memorandum decision overruling condemnor's objections to
commission's report and confirming it in all respects, including findings as to just com-
pensation, but containing no direction to the clerk of the court to enter judgment (and
also lacking sufficient findings upon which clerk could compute money judgment) was
held not to constitute a "final judgment," in United States v. Evans, 365 F.2d 95 (10th
Cir. 1966). See also United States v. 3,065.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, 187 F. Supp.
728 (S.D. Cal. 1960). But see supra note 18.
For illustrative material on what is an appealable order or judgment in state con-
demnation practice, see Bell, supra note 12, at 151-54.
2 3 See, e.g., Cunningham v. United States, 270 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Chase, 260 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Jones Beach Parkway Authority,
255 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), aft'd, 358 U.S. 832 (1958); United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
253 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958); United States v. Waymire, 202
F.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1953).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Benning, 330 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v.
2,872.88 Acres of Land, More or Less, 310 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. 26.81
Acres of Land, More or Less, 244 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
25 See, e.g., United States v. 9.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, 183 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.
Va. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
26 See, e.g., In re Huie, 2 N.Y.2d 168, 139 N.E.2d 140, 157 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1956); Mis-
sissippi State H-ighway Comm'n v. Williamson, 181 Miss. 599, 179 So. 736 (1938); Talbot
v. Norfolk, 158 Va. 387, 163 S.E. 100 (1932).
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the amounts put forth by the parties' appraisal experts. 27 In the usual
case, the appellate court would have to usurp the function of the
trier of the facts in order to set aside the finding arrived at below.
This is perhaps the single most important consideration to keep in
mind in deciding whether to appeal and in framing the issues on
appeal. It is axiomatic that the condemnee is appealing because he
is convinced the award is inadequate. Appellant's counsel, however,
should avoid making inadequacy his main contention and concentrate
on the errors below which will provide the leverage to obtain a
reversal or modification of the award .2
On the state level, it should be borne in mind that intermediate
appellate courts sometimes have the power to review both the law
and the facts, while the highest courts in each state are ordinarily
limited to reviewing questions of law.2 9 However, the significance
of this distinction is diminished by the fact that even intermediate
appellate courts apply the rule that the findings below will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
POWER OF COURT WHERE FINDINGS ARE SET ASIDE IN WHOLE
OR IN PART
A key element in preparing every condemnation appeal is the
power of the tribunal in question, once it reaches the conclusion
that the findings must be set aside in whole or in part. In federal
practice, the district court, when reviewing the findings of commis-
sioners, may act as it would with respect to the report of a Master
under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules. 3 Accordingly, the court may
27 See, e.g., United States v. 2,635.04 Acres of Land, More or Less, 336 F.2d 646 (6th
Cir. 1964). As to a similar rule of thumb in state courts, see Bell, Preserving Error for
Appeal of the Eminent Domain Case, 1959 S.W.L.F. INSr. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 151.
28 For a survey of the most recurring errors cited in federal condemnation appeals,
see infra text accompanying notes 41-89.
29 In New York, for example, the powers of the intermediate appellate court and court
of last resort differ markedly. The appellate division must affirm or reject the findings of
commissioners which were adopted below; the court may not modify the order under
review. In cases tried to a judge without a jury, however, the appellate division may
modify, as well as affirm or reverse. The powers of the New York Court of Appeals also
vary with the originating tribunal as well as with the action taken by the appellate divi-
sion. In cases originating in an order approving the findings of commissioners, the court
is limited to affirming or reversing. In cases originating in a nonjury trial before a judge,
if only quantum is at issue, the court must choose between the award of the trial court and
that set by the appellate division. It should be noted, however, that the court may modify
the awards of both lower courts in such cases, if an erroneous valuation or other legal
theory was applied. See generally COHEN & KARGER, PowExRs OF THE Nmv YORK COURT OF
APPxAis (rev. ed. 1952). For a survey of other state procedures, see Sackman, supra note 8,
at 145-46.
30 Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows:
In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings of
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modify or reject the findings, in whole or in part, elicit further
evidence, or recommit the case to the commissioners.31 Where the
error is clear on the record and the question is one which lends itself
to a legal determination, the court may correct the error without
further proceedings of any kind.32 In a few instances, federal district
courts have gone so far as to relieve the commissioners of a case
(especially in instances wherein they have unduly procrastinated),
even before the commissioners reached their findings.33
The United States court of appeals has broad powers with
respect to a condemnation award under review. Irrespective of
whether the case below was tried by a judge, jury or commission,
the court of appeals may affirm, reverse, or modify the findings.34 It
is likely to follow the latter course where the error on the record is
clear and lends itself to ready adjustment. Thus, for example, the
court is more likely to draw its own inferences where the trier of the
facts below had to draw inferences from documentary proof in the
record.35 Again, if the award is either grossly excessive or deficient,
the court may cure the defect via remittur, unless the party agrees
to accept a specified figure.3 6 The court of appeals will send the
entire matter back for a new trial where the error or errors below
were such as to vitiate the initial trial (thereby making it impossible
to salvage what had already been done). Thus, for example, a plenary
new trial was awarded where the government's experts had testified
on the basis of the erroneous assumption that the parcel was smaller
than it actually was. Here the court granted a new trial and refused
fact unless dearly erroneous. Within 10 days after being served with notice of the
filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other
parties. Application to the court for action upon the report and upon objections
thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court
after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in
part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions.
31 United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964); United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d B00
(4th Cir. 1962). See also Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
32 United States v. Certain Interests In Property, 296 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Tampa Bay Garden Apartments, Inc., 294 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957). See generally Taylor, Federal Condemna-
tion Proceedings And How They Differ From State Proceedings, A.B.A. NATioNAL INsr.
63 (1967).
33 See United States v. Vater, 259 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1958). Cf. United States v. Bobinski,
244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 (1964).
35 See United States v. Adamant Co., 197 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 903
(1952).
36 Thus, for example, in United States v. 86.52 Acres of Land, More or Less, 250 F.
Supp. 619 (W.D. Mo. 1966), a new trial was ordered unless the condemnee consented to
reduce the award from $6,245 to $1,925.
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to remand the case for a judgment based on the lower of two ap-
praisals offered by the condemnee's experts.37 Similarly, a jury verdict
was set aside and a new trial ordered where a claimant's witness
testified, over objection, to unexercised options on contiguous tracts,
where there was no other evidence in the record from which the jury
could have made so high an award.38
In state practice, condemnee's counsel should examine the local
statutory framework to determine the forms of relief which the ap-
pellate court may grant, and shape his legal arguments accordingly.
Among the questions to be researched is whether the appellate tri-
bunal's course of action varies depending upon whether the award
under review is that of a judge, jury, or commission. Similarly, coun-
,sel should seek to ascertain whether the available forms of relief differ
at various stages of appeals, as one ascends the ladder.39 It should be
noted, however, that a new trial may not be desirable in every case.
Where, for example, favorable findings have been made below, it
may behoove counsel to strive for limited results on appeal, as, for
example, a modification of the findings below or a remand for ad-
ditional proceedings, limited, however, to certain portions of the
case.
40
ILLUSTRATIVE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
Just as a capable attorney prepares a memorandum of law pre-
paratory to trying a case (or perhaps drafting his initial pleading),
it is a sound practice for the condemnee's counsel to be acquainted
in advance with the errors which have proved productive of reversals
in his own jurisdiction. Thus, for example, in one state the courts
might closely scrutinize expert testimony, while in another, erroneous
charges to the jury or commissioners might be the most productive
grounds for appeal. Again, it is axiomatic that the condemnee would
not be appealing unless he felt the award below was inadequate.
However, his objective of an increased award or new hearing may
best be obtained by directing his attack to legal errors in the record
(on the assumption that they alone or in combination misled the
trier of the fact and conceivably accounted for the unsatisfactory
award). The following classes of cases represent some of the most
37 Benecke v. United States, 356 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1966).
38 United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966).
39 See supra notes 27-29.




frequently raised issues on appeal in federal condemnations, and are
no doubt symptomatic of state practice as well.
(1) Denial of a Jury Trial
Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent a
special statute designating a different tribunal, states "any party may
have a trial by jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a
demand therefor within the time allowed for answer or within such
further time as the court may fix, unless the court in its discretion
orders that, because of the character, location or quantity of the prop-
erty to be condemed, or for other reasons in the interest of justice,
the issue of compensation shall be determined by a commission of
three persons appointed by it."41 If neither of the foregoing proce-
dures are invoked, all issues are tried by the court without a jury.42
Although there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in
condemnation cases, it is the favored method of trial in most states
and in the federal courts.43 So much was this so, that reversals were
obtained of district court references to commissioners, where "com-
pelling reasons" for such a reference were not found to be present.
Thus, for example, it was held that court calendar congestion alone
was not a sufficient basis for denying a request for a jury trial.44
Indicative of the reasons which might support a reference were the
nature of the property, terrain, and uses, the nature of the rights or
interests for which compensation is sought, the complexity of issues,
impossibility of trying the issues before a single jury, and probability
that the appointment of commissioners would result in more uniform
awards.45 The leading case on the subject, United States v. Merz,46
took a similar view in 1964, with Mr. Justice Douglas declaring that
"the use of a commission to resolve the issue of just compensation
41 In federal condemnations, trial by jury is said to be the usual or preferable method
of trial. For the view that the expense and inconvenience of a jury trial gives the Federal
Government an edge over small property owners whose land has been taken, see Paul,
Condemnation Procedure Under Federal Rule 71-A, 43 IowA L. Ry. 231, 236 (1958).
42 FED. P. Civ. P. 71A(h). For the procedure under the Tucker Act (which covers
"inverse condemnation"), see Taylor, Federal Condemnation Proceedings, A.BA. NATIONAL
INSr. 58 (1967).
43 Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg, 318 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1963). Thus, the
Eighth Circuit has noted that a jury trial should be had if there is any doubt as to the
proper method of trial. See United States v. Bell, 363 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1966).
44 United States v. Hall, 274 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960). But
see United States v. Merz, 376 US. 192 (1964).
45See Franklin County, Ga. v. United States, 841 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Delaware L. & W.R.RL, 264 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 861 U.S. 819 (1959);
United States v. Vater, 259 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. 2,477.79 Acres of
Land, More or Less, 259 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1958).
46 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
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is justified by the facility with which commissioners may inspect the
property and a likelihood that uniformity of awards may be realized
expeditiously."47 This would indicate that henceforth courts of appeal
may not be as ready to set aside a reference to commissioners as they
were in the past.
Assuming arguendo that a denial of a jury trial is unwarranted,
the claimant is faced with a procedural stumbling block insofar as
an order of reference would ordinarily be considered a non-appeal-
able, non-final order. If no appeal is taken from the order of reference
until the case has been completed before commissioners, the court
of appeals is unlikely to set aside proper findings of the commission
on the ground that a jury trial should have been had in the first
instance. Nevertheless, many courts have held that an order of ref-
erence is a non-final order and hence not appealable.48 At least one
circuit has taken a contrary view, indicating that a mandamus pro-
ceeding may be available, in a proper case, to compel the district
court to grant the requested jury trial.49 The outcome of this question
in state courts would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 0
(2) Failure of the Trier of the Facts to Make an Adequate
Record
A frequent complaint of reviewing courts, both state and federal,
is that the trier of the facts failed to make an adequate record of the
proceedings below, thereby frustrating appellate review. With in-
creasing frequency this complaint has been voiced with respect to
the work-product of both judges5' and commissioners. 52 It provides
an excellent avenue of approach on appeal, provided, of course, the
appellant has not contributed to the defect by his conduct below.
As previously noted, the claimant's lawyer should take all the steps
47 Id. at 197.
48 See, e.g., United States v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, 334 F.2d 229 (4th Cir.
1964); Beneke v. Weick, 275 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1960).
49 See United States v. Hall, 274 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 US. 990 (1960).
For a survey of instances in which a reference to commissioners would be proper, see
S. Searles, Trends in the Law of Condemnation, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL PRAcrscE 534,
541 (Am. Inst. Real Estate Appraisers 1961).
50 See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Spetko, 15 App. Div. 2d 789, 224 N.Y.S.2d 776 (4th
Dep't 1962). On the relative advantages of trial by jury and trial by commissioners, see
P. ROHAN & M. RISKIN, supra note 7.
51 See, e.g., Conklin v. New York, 22 App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't
1965); In re City of New York, 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1960).
See also S. Searles, Trends in the Law of Condemnation, CONDEMNATION APPLAISAL PRAC-
TIcE 534, 541 (Am. Inst. Real Estate Appraisers 1961).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 363 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1966); In re City of New York,
278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281 (1938); Schenectady v. Lauricella, 9 App. Div. 2d 996, 194
N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1959).
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necessary to have a detailed transcript made, to make excluded evi-
dence available to the reviewing court in the record, to request ap-
propriate charges, and to seek special findings where the outcome
depends in large measure upon the answer given to certain key
questions or issues. Again, where various elements of damage to a
parcel may be segregated, clarity may demand that they be separately
listed for the benefit of the reviewing court.53
Despite earlier precedents to the contrary, it is now generally
agreed that commissioners and judges, trying cases without a jury,
are both required to make findings dispositive of the key issues raised
before them. In United States v. Merz, this duty was delineated as
follows:
The judge who uses commissioners, however, establishes a tribunal that
may become freewheeling, taking the law from itself, unless subject to
close supervision. The first responsibility of the District Court, apart
from the selection of responsible commissioners, is careful instruction of
them on the law. That was done in one of the present cases. But the
instructions should explain with some particularity the qualifications
of expert witnesses, the weight to be given other opinion evidence,
competent evidence of value, 'the best evidence of value, illustrative
examples of severance damages, and the like. The commissioners should
be instructed as to the manner of the hearing and the method of con-
ducting it, of the right to view the property, and of the limited purpose
of viewing. They should be instructed on the kind of evidence that is
inadmissible and the manner of ruling on it. The commissioners should
also be instructed as to the kind of report to be filed. Since by Rule
71A(h) the report has the effect of a master's findings of fact under
Rule 53(e)(2), the commission should be instructed as to what kind of
findings should be included. Conclusory findings are alone not sufficient,
for the commission's findings shall be accepted by the court "unless
clearly erroneous"; and conclusory findings as made in these cases are
normally not reviewable by that standard, even when the District Court
reads the record, for it will have no way of knowing what path the
commissioners took through the maze of conflicting evidence. See United
States v. Lewis, 308 F.2d 453, 458. The commissioners need not make
detailed findings such as judges do who try a case without a jury. Com-
missioners, we assume, will normally be laymen, inexperienced in the
53 The following directive is worthy of note: "It would be helpful for a final determi-
nation of the issues if the Special Term would make a new decision to include specific
findings as to the sums allowed for direct taking, consequential damage, and for fixtures,
together with an indication as to which items were held to constitute fixtures." In re City
of New York, 10 App. Div. 2d 865, 199 N.Y.S.2d 915 (2d Dep't 1960).
One experienced practitioner suggests that where impending change of zone is a
factor, the trier of the facts list separately a basic value per parcel and the increment
attributed to the zoning factor. Sackman, Condemnation Appeals, 8TH S.W.L.F. INst. ON
EMINENT DOMAiN 127, 132 (1968).
1969]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
law. But laymen can be instructed to reveal the reasoning they use in
deciding on a particular award, what standard they try to follow, which
line of testimony they adopt, what measure of severance damages they
use, and so on. We do not say that every contested issue raised on the
record before the commission must be resolved by a separate finding of
fact. We do not say that there must be an array of findings of subsidiary
facts to demonstrate that the ultimate finding of value is soundly and
legally based. The path followed by the commissioners in reaching the
amount of the award can, however, be distinctly marked. Such a require-
ment is within the competence of laymen; and laymen, like judges,
will give more careful consideration to the problem if they are required
to state not only the end result of their inquiry, but the process by which
they reached it.5
Similar directives are being issued by state appellate courts with
increasing frequency.55
(3) Misconduct of Judge, Jurors, Commissioners,
or Attorneys
As in most judicial proceedings, a reversal may be obtained
where timely objection was taken to misconduct on the part of one
of the participants. Expressions of bias by a judge or commissioner, 6
interference with the function of the attorney or jury,57 reliance by
jurors on unauthorized publications, and similar errors should be
raised on appeal.5 The same is true of inflammatory remarks of
counsel in opening or closing to the jury. 9 However, the latter is a
two-edged sword and condemnors have secured reversals in more than
one instance on the strength of unwarranted and prejudicial state-
ments volunteered by the condemnee's counsel. Thus, for example,
overzealous remarks concerning the limited value of today's dollar
54376 U.S. at 198-99. The Court distinguished a condemnation case tried by a jury,
insofar as the jury remained under the Court's direction and control throughout the trial.
Accordingly, a jury's general verdict as to damages would not be overturned for lack of
particularized findings.
55 See, e.g., Brinkley v. Ives, 153 Corn. 718, 220 A.2d 438 (1966); Golden Park Realty
Corp. v. State, 28 App. Div. 2d 605, 279 N.Y.S.2d 916 (3d Dep't 1967); Conklin v. State, 22
App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1965).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 308 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Silver
Queen Mining Co., 285 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1960); In re Freeport Brook Drain, 22 App.
Div. 2d 928, 255 N.Y.S.2d 701 (2d Dep't 1964); In re Real Properties in Town of Easthamp-
ton, 42 Misc. 2d 376, 248 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
57 See, e.g., H & R Corp. v. District of Columbia, 351 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
United States v. 18A6 Acres of Land, More or Less, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Monterey County, 186
F. Supp. 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960), aff'd, 308 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1962). See generally Bell, Preserv-
ing Error For Appeal Of The Eminent Domain Case, 1959 S.W.L.F. INsT. ON EMINENT
DOMAIN 151, 157.




and the unlimited resources of the condemning authority should be
scrupulously avoided.
(4) Errors in the Judge's Charge
Although many charges are routine in condemnation cases,
errors in charges and denials of requests to charge have proved a
fertile source of grounds for appeal. Once again, however, the opinion
in United States v. Merz lays down several prerequisites in this area,
especially as regards trials conducted by commissioners:
Moreover, the litigants have a responsibility to assist the process by
specifying their objections to instructions, by offering alternative ones,
and by making their timely objections to the report in specific, rather
than generalized form, as required by equity practice.60
In both state and federal practice, it is advisable to prepare written
requests to charge well in advance, along with citations to relevant
supporting authorities. As the Merz opinion indicates, objections
to the judge's proposed charge to a jury or commissioners should
also be submitted in advance, along with alternative charges.
It should also be noted that jury charges may constitute revers-
ible error, where they have the effect of taking disputed fact questions
out of the jury's hands. Thus, for example, in most instances,
questions of credibility should not be resolved by the court.6
Similarly, contested factual issues, such as the relevance of certain
sales or the imminence of a change of zone will normally present
issues for the trier of the facts, and the judge's charge should contain
no indication to the contrary.62
(5) Comparable Sales
The crux of a great many condemnation cases lies in the pre-
sentation of comparable sales by the contesting parties. While the
admission or exclusion of sales offered as "comparable" is entrusted
to the court's sound discretion, errors in both the admission and ex-
clusion of proffered sales may provide a fruitful avenue of appeal.
Thus, for example, it has been held error to exclude a relevant,
60 376 U.S. at 199.
61 See, e.g., H & R Corp. v. District of Columbia, 351 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965). On
comparable sales generally, see P. RoHAN & M. REsKiN, CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES &
TECHNIQUEs ch. 13 (1968).
62 See, e.g., H & R Corp. v. District of Columbia, 351 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
For the view that a large number of comparable sales should be employed by the ex-
pert witness, see Coon, The Appellate Lawyer Looks at Opinion Evidence in an Appro-
priation Case, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 305, 308-10 (1967).
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recent sale, in a case wherein the extent of recent increases in value
was at issue.63 Again, where the appellate court finds that sales ad-
mitted over objection as comparable sales are utterly different from
the subject parcel, a reversal will normally result.64 On the other
hand, at least one court has indicated that the claimant's attorney
must seize the opportunity to impugn such defective sales via cross-
examination.65 It is also established that comparable sales need not
be offered in each and every condemnation case, and an award may
be bottomed on other evidence.6 6 Although such sales are often said
to be the best evidence of market value, it has been held proper to
refuse to so charge in a case wherein the proffered sales were sharply
contested on the question of comparability.67
(6) Expert Testimony
Failure to properly qualify an expert, his failure to lay a founda-
tion for his conclusions, and his reliance upon faulty information
or legal principles, have all proved an adequate basis for reversing
a lower court's award. It is not sufficient that an expert be a real
estate broker or professional appraiser, if it is not demonstrated on
the record that he is in fact familiar with the parcel and neighborhood
in question.68 Conversely, if such familiarity is demonstrated, an
individual may qualify as an expert witness, although his profession
is not directly related to real estate transactions.6 9 Even the layman
may testify as to his property's value (although the weight of his
testimony may not be great).70 Where the expert's qualifications are
63 United States v. 63.04 Acres of Land, More or Less, 245 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1957).
64 United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966); Yennock v. State, 23 App.
Div. 2d 809, 258 N.Y.S.2d 490 (4th Dep't 1965).
65 See United States v. Eden Memorial Park Ass'n, 350 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1965);
United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land, More or Less, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963). Where the
applicable procedural rules require exchanges of appraisals and/or comparable sales before
trial, or permit discovery of such items, the time remaining before trial should be utilized
in investigating possible flaws in the condemnor's appraisal or comparable sales.
Where the judge's charge to the jury or commissioners on the use to be made of
comparable sales testimony is erroneous, prompt objection should be made. See United
States v. 84A Acres of Land, More or Less, 348 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1965).
66 United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966).
67 United States v. Baker, 279 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1960).
68 United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, More or Less, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Johnson, 285 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1960). The appraisal expert should not
merely adopt prior testimony of another expert witness, but should instead demonstrate
fully his familiarity with the subject property and the appropriate methods of evaluating
it. Moreover, all or part of his written appraisal should be made part of the record as an
exhibit.
69 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 145 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1944); Love v.
United States, 141 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1944).




impressive, it has been held that the claimant's counsel has a right
to present those credentials and is not required to stipulate as to
them at the behest of the condemnor.7 1 In any event, the expert's
familiarity with the property and area must appear in the record
in one form or another.72
As noted earlier, appellate courts have exhibited a growing
impatience with appraisal testimony couched exclusively in terms of
mere conclusions. 3 Failure to spell out the expert's chain of reason-
ing, valuation theory, and basic factual assumptions may vitiate his
testimony entirely. The same is true where the expert's testimony
discloses reliance upon an incorrect legal theory or factual data.
Typical errors include incorrect assumptions as to acreage, zoning
and comparable sales, as well as reliance upon pieces of evidence
(such as unexercised options) which are clearly inadmissible." It
should be noted, however, that the courts have not adhered strictly
to hearsay and other evidentiary rules with respect to the expert's
factual bases for his conclusions. Thus, for example, the test of a
comparable sale has been relaxed somewhat when the sales are not
offered as comparables but as background data relied upon by the
expert in formulating his own conclusions as to value.7 5 It should
also be noted that appellate courts will look with disfavor upon
alleged errors in expert testimony, if claimant's counsel has made
little effort to point up these errors below, through timely objections
and cross-examination. 76
One further aspect of expert testimony should be noted, that
is, it is considered to be advisory only. Nevertheless, the trier of the
facts cannot ordinarily go outside of the record and reach a deter-
mination lacking support in the record. Accordingly, most awards
71 Wolf v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 341 F.2d 945 (Ist Cir. 1965).
72 "All courts recognize the reasons given by an expert may be of utmost importance
in weighing the value of the opinions given. All of the varying circumstances and elements
which a reasonable person would consider in arriving at fair market value, including
items which fairly afford a test of the accuracy of the reasons given by the expert appraisers
in arriving at their ultimate conclusions of value, are properly subject of evidentiary
proof." Riverside v. Kraft, 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 304, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428 (1962).
73 See the extensive treatment of this topic in Coon, The Appellate Lawyer Looks At
Opinion Evidence in an Appropriation Case, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 305, 306-09 (1967).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Cer-
tain Interests in Property, 296 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961).
75 See United States v. Featherton, 325 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Johnson, 285 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Certain Interests in Property in
Cascade County, 205 F. Supp. 745 (D. Mont. 1962).
76 See, e.g., United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land, More or Less, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.
1963); District of Columbia v. Lot 813 in Square 568, 232 F. Supp. 714. (D.D.C. 1964),
aff'd, 346 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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fall within the "range of testimony," and hence can be easily sus-
tained as consonant with the expert's views expressed on the trial. 7
On rare occasion, however, there may be sufficient other evidence
in the case to enable the trier of the facts to reject the expert testi-
mony offered by both sides.78
(7) Hearsay and Other Violations of the Rules of Evidence
It is widely recognized that it is a practical impossibility to ad-
here strictly to all the rules of evidence in condemnation cases,
especially where such claims are tried before commissioners. Similarly,
as in civil appeals generally, appellate courts are prone to disregard
technical errors below, where the errors complained of constitute
"harmless error."79 As a consequence, it is not fruitful to belabor
inconsequential violation of the hearsay, best evidence and other
traditional rules of evidence, unless the cumulative impact of the
errors below was to materially affect the award. Most of these objec-
tions go to the manner in which a fact was proven, as opposed to
the basic admissibility of the fact itself. However, where a piece of
evidence is offered as an independent indicator of value (as, for
example, an unexercised option to purchase), or forms an important
link in an appraisal expert's testimony, objections to admissibility
should be pushed, if evidence of that particular type is not admis-
sible for the intended purpose.8 0
This is not to say that hearsay and other objections should be
waived indiscriminately at the trial below. In addition to their
possible cumulative effect, objections to such testimony tend to call
the attention of the trier of the facts to imperfections in the proffered
evidence, and to reduce its weight accordingly.8'
77 See, e.g., United States v. 2,635.04 Acres of Land, More or Less, 336 F.2d 646 (6th
Cir. 1964); Seale v. United States, 243 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1957).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 248 F.2d 822 (4th Cir. 1957);
Hazard Lewis Farms, Inc. v. State, 1 App. Div. 2d 923, 149 N.Y.S.2d 658 (3d Dep't 1956).
79 See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 372 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1967); Paper v. District
of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Gale Realty Corp.
v. United States, 249 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Hirsch, 206 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1953). On the relaxation of the rules of evidence in condemnation cases generally,
see Helman, PRESENTATION OF A CONDEMNATION CASE IN COURT, THE PRAcTICAL PROBLEMS
OF CONDEMNATION 18, 19 (1965).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966). Reliance upon an
erroneous theory of value, or the improper application of a correct theory of value should
also be made the subject of objections and appeals. See Coon, supra note 73, at 310-12.
81 See Bell, Preserving Error For Appeal Of The Eminent Domain Case, 1959
S.W.LY. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 101, 162-63.
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(8) Inadequacy or Excessiveness
Most condemnation awards fall within the "range of testimony"
and hence are all but immune from attack on the mere question of
quantum. Nevertheless, as in sporadic negligence cases, appellate
courts occasionally find an award to be so high (or low) as to "shock
the conscience. 's2 As often as not, however, the court finds the error
to be an overly generous award, as opposed to a meager one. In
view of this, and in view of the tendency of this line of argument
to dull the sharpness of an appellant's legal arguments, a frontal
assault on the question of quantum should be used sparingly.
(9) Impending Change of Zone
Whether a change of zone (or the granting of a variance) is
sufficiently imminent to have an effect on market value is normally
a question for the trier of the facts based on all the evidence. Where
such is the case, the court should avoid interfering with that function
by passing on questions of credibility8 3 or by a charge which gives
the jury the impression that the question is one of law for the court.8 4
Absent a proper foundation, however, an objection can be taken to
expert testimony based on an assumed change of zone. Moreover,
where there is evidence on the question, care should still be taken
not to permit one's expert to rely upon the impending change of
zone as an accomplished fact.s5
(10) Propriety of a View
Appellate courts are kindly disposed to a view, in much the same
way as they credit the trier of the facts with having gained insight
by seeing and hearing the witnesses. Moreover, the granting of a
view to the jury or commission typically rests in the trial court's
sound discretion.8 6 Accordingly, the mere fact that a view was taken,
without more, will seldom prove availing on appeal. Where the
view should not have been granted because of changed conditions,
where the view was taken without the court's knowledge or permis-
82 See, e.g., United States v. 9.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, 188 F. Supp. 402
(E.D. Va. 1956), af'd, 279 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. 86.52 Acres of Land,
More or Less, 250 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
83 See, e.g., H & R Corp. v. District of Columbia, 851 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
84 H 8& R Corp. v. District of Columbia, 851 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States
v. Certain Land in City of Red Bluff, 192 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
85 See, e.g., Yennock v. State, 28 App. Div. 2d 809, 258 N.Y.S.2d 490 (4th Dep't 1965).
86 United States v. Johnson, 285 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. 4,475.23 Acres
of Land, More or Less, 151 F. Supp. 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), aj'd, 254 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1957).
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sion, or was influenced by one side, a reversal may result.8 7 In any
event, objections to the view should be voiced at the earliest possible
moment.
(11) Lack of Necessity or Other Legal Objection to the Propriety
of the Taking
Absent an allegation of fraud or bad faith of some kind, federal
appellate courts have not been receptive to legal arguments directed
to the legality of the taking. Thus, for example, attacks made on
the "necessity" for the taking have generally proved unavailing.
State courts, however, have proved slightly more receptive to such
arguments, although they have generally been rejected. In any event,
if counsel has serious thoughts of fashioning an argument along
these lines, he should consider raising the question by the way of an
order to show cause, injunction or other extraordinary remedy,
coupled with an immediate appeal.88 If this type of argument is
taken up as part of the full case, the property may be completely
destroyed before the case is reached for appellate argument."9
(12) Res Judicata
As the extract quoted from the Merz case indicates,90 objections
must be raised with specificity and preserved for use on appeal. 91 A
party who does not appeal cannot take the benefit of a reversal
secured by another party similarly situated.92 Also, objections which
were not raised below cannot be voiced for the first time on appeal
or on remand of the case for additional proceedings. 93 The res
87 See Webb v. United States, 256 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1958). The denial of a view
requested by the condemnee should also be questioned, as well as changed conditions
in cases in which the view is granted over the condemnee's objections.
88 See generally United States v. 442.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, 264 F. Supp. 506
(S.D. Iowa 1967); United States v. 620.98 Acres of Land, More or Less, 255 F. Supp. 427
(W.D. Ark. 1966); United States v. Certain Lands in Raritan & Woodbridge Townships,
144 F. Supp. 206 (D.N.J. 1954). For a survey of recent state cases going both ways on the
issue of necessity, see A.B.A., REPORT OF THE Com€mrrrEa ON CONDEMNATION AND CON-
DEMNATION PROCEDURE 16-24 (1967).
89 On the availability of injunctions and other extraordinary remedies to contest
the legality of a taking, see Martin v. United States, 270 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1959); Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. City of Lyons, 166 F. Supp. 676 (D. Neb. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 273
(8th Cir. 1959).
90 376 U.S. at 199.
91 Objections properly interposed may be waived if not reviewed when similar in-
admissible evidence is subsequently offered, or if the condemnee himself offers the same
type of objectionable evidence. See United States v. Bodie Island, 262 F. Supp. 190 (E.D.
N.C. 1967).
92See Annat v. Beard, 277 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1960).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 308 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. 881.39
Acres of Land, More or Less, 254 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Okla. 1966).
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judicata rationale embodied in these decisions has been applied to
both the condemnee and to the federal government."
REqUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL
As part of one's appellate strategy, a timely motion for a new
trial may be lodged with the trial court, based upon alleged errors.
In some states, such a motion is required before an appeal can be
perfected. 95 Such a motion would, of course, serve its most useful
function where the case was originally tried to a jury. However, the
chances of success on such a motion (whether based on newly dis-
covered evidence or otherwise) are remote, absent a readily discern-
able legal error or an award which is clearly contrary to the evi-
dence."
THE CONDEMNATION BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
As noted earlier, a condemnee appealing from an award has
an uphill fight for several reasons. The appellate court quite correctly
acknowledges that the function of trying the matter in the first
instance belongs to the trier of the facts, and that the latter saw and
heard the witnesses (and possibly viewed the site). Moreover, there
is a tacit assumption that the condemnee's main, if not exclusive,
complaint is that the award is not large enough. Finally, there is
the probability that the award (whatever its faults may be), falls
within the range of testimony offered on the trial. Faced with this
array, the condemnee's counsel must fashion a brief which will draw
the court's attention to the fact that the case involves substantial
questions of law and potential injustice. In order to succeed, the
brief cannot get bogged down in factual minutiae or technical prob-
lems.97 Instead, it should seize upon the significant legal errors,
94 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan,
344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965).
95 See generally Bell, Preserving Error For Appeal of the Condemnation Award, 1959
S.WV.LF. INSr. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 151, 158.
98 Under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to set aside
a judgment in a condemnation action must be made within a reasonable period
of time. On new trials generally, see Dicker v. United States, 352 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 US. 936 (1966); United States v. 72.71 Acres of Land, More or
Less, 23 F.R.D. 635 (D. Md. 1959), aft'd, 273 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1960). The usual rules gov-
erning alleged "newly discovered evidence" apply to condemnation cases.
97 Neither the brief nor the oral argument should be weighted down with intri-
cate factual data. Such material is available to the reviewing court in the record. Instead
the brief should provide the court with sound legal grounds for reversing an inadequate
award, thereby making it unnecessary in a real sense for the judges to get bogged down
in the factual minutiae. See the model condemnation brief set forth in P. RoHAm & M.
RESFIN, CONDEMINATION PROCEDURES & TECHNIQUES § 9.10 (1968).
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thereby drawing the court's attention from the factual maze to the
more familiar legal bases for decision. Where locations, directions
or other aspects of the property play a key role, the court should be
oriented through use of selected exhibits, maps, and diagrams in
the appellate brief.98
Oral argument should not be neglected in condemnation appeals.
Submission without argument tends to leave the impression that the
appeal is like a great many others, that is, largely an expression of
dissatisfaction with the amount obtained below. Oral argument should
be seized upon as a vehicle for underscoring the legal errors below
and their probable effect upon the outcome at the trial level. The
oral presentation also affords counsel one last opportunity to resolve
doubts that may have arisen in the appellate judges' mind as to the
facts, the equities, and the law applicable to the case.
98 One experienced practitioner suggests the advisability of preparing one's own dia-
grams, in a proper case, for inclusion in the brief. See Sackman, Condemnation Appeals,
8th S.W.L.F. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 127, 157 (1968). On oral argument generally see
BREITEL, COUNSEL ON APPEAL (1968); Cuomo, The New York Court of Appeals: A Practi-
cal Perspective, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 197 (1960).
